

Message Text

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C O N F I D E N T I A L MBFR VIENNA 0107

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PARM, NATO
SUBJ: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: MARCH 10 WESTERN PLENARY STATEMENT

THE 129TH PLENARY MEETING OF THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS WAS HELD ON MARCH 10 UNDER THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF LUXEMBOURG REP (WINTER) WHO ALSO DELIVERED THE ONLY STATEMENT. HIS PRESENTATION CRITICIZED THE IMPRACTICAL AND INEQUITABLE NATURE OF THE EAST'S ACROSS-THE-BOARD APPROACH TO ARMAMENTS REDUCTIONS AS OPPOSED TO THE WEST'S MIXED PACKAGE APPROACH, WHICH PROVIDED A REALISTIC WAY TO RESOLVE THE ARMAMENTS ISSUE. THE MAIN POINTS OF THE LUXEMBOURG STATEMENT, THE FULL TEXT OF WHICH FOLLOWS BY AIRGRAM, WERE:

1. THE EASTERN COMPREHENSIVE, ACROSS-THE-BOARD APPROACH TO CONFIDENTIAL

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ARMAMENTS REDUCTIONS WOULD RESULT IN AN OUTCOME HIGHLY PREJUDICIAL TO WESTERN SECURITY AND IS, THUS, INCONSISTENT WITH THE AGREED GOALS OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS.

2. THE EAST'S REDUCTIONS APPROACH, WHICH HAS REMAINED UNCHANGED THROUGHOUT THE NEGOTIATIONS, IS INEQUITABLE IN THAT IT WOULD CONTRACTUALIZE THE CONSIDERABLE NUMERICAL

ADVANTAGES AT PRESENT ENJOYED BY THE EAST IN MOST MAJOR ARMAMENTS AS WELL AS IN MILITARY MANPOWER.

3. THE WEST BELIEVES REDUCTIONS SHOULD FOCUS ON GROUND FORCE MANPOWER AND SELECTED ARMAMENTS.

4. THE WEST'S PRESENT RIGHT TO MAKE GOOD THE DISPARITIES FAVORING THE EAST IS AN IMPORTANT COMPONENT OF WESTERN SECURITY.

5. THE WEST WILL NOT ACCEPT THE CONTRACTUALIZATION OF EASTERN NUMERICAL SUPERIORITY IN ANY FORCE ELEMENT.

6. THE DAMAGING AND INEQUITABLE EFFECTS OF THE EAST'S POSITION ON ARMAMENTS WOULD BE INTENSIFIED BY THE EAST'S GEOGRAPHIC ADVANTAGES STEMMING FROM THE SOVIET UNION'S LOCATION ADJACENT TO THE AREA.

7. MOREOVER, EASTERN PROPOSALS ON ARMAMENTS WOULD BE IMPRACTICAL AND PROHIBITIVELY COMPLEX TO NEGOTIATE AND IMPLEMENT.

8. PARTICIPANTS WOULD HAVE TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THE EXACT EQUIVALENTS AND PRECISE NUMBERS OF EACH TYPE OF ARMAMENT IN THE AREA.

9. IN CONTRAST WITH THE EAST'S ADHERENCE TO ITS ORIGINAL, UNREALISTIC APPROACH, IN DECEMBER 1975 THE WEST MADE A MAJOR MOVE TO RECONCILE THE CONFLICTING APPROACHES OF THE TWO

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SIDES TO ARMAMENTS REDUCTIONS.

10. THE ORIGINAL WESTERN APPROACH SOUGHT AN OUTCOME OF APPROXIMATE PARITY IN GROUND FORCES THROUGH THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A COMMON CEILING ON GROUND FORCE MANPOWER AND THE REDUCTION OF THE EAST'S SUPERIORITY IN TANKS.

11. WITH ITS DECEMBER 1975 PROPOSALS, THE WEST ADDED THE REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF CERTAIN US NUCLEAR COMPONENTS PLUS A COMBINED COMMON CEILING ON AIR AND GROUND MANPOWER TO THE BURDEN IT WAS PREVIOUSLY PREPARED TO ASSUME.

12. THIS WESTERN MOVE TOOK REASONABLE ACCOUNT OF THE EAST'S DESIRE TO COVER AIR AND NUCLEAR ELEMENTS, WHILE PROVIDING THE ONLY REALISTIC WAY OF RECONCILING THE REDUCTION APPROACHES TO THE TWO SIDES.

13. THE EAST HAS YET TO MAKE A MOVE COMPARABLE TO THE DECEMBER 1975 WESTERN PROPOSALS OR TO RESPOND TO THEM IN A

SERIOUS AND POSITIVE WAY.RESOR

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